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Private benefits of control (PBC) are sub-topic of principal-agent theory. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) clearly pointed out that the conflict between large and small 
shareholders dominates company's agent problem in market with poor legal protection 
of investors. China’s securities market is a newly emerging market developed in the 
process of a transitional economy. The pervasive existence of large shareholders and 
lack of full legal protection of minor investors make PBC deserved much attention. 
Managers of listed companies act as the shadow and agent of large shareholders under 
the latter’s strong control, which transform the contracts between them into contracts 
between large and small shareholders. Using contract theory, I establish an analytical 
framework and try to offer an interpretation of PBC from transaction costs and 
incompleteness of contract, information asymmetry, large shareholders’ control, 
opportunistic motive, and regulation. 
The author further expands the thesis to study the impact of PBC on earnings 
management, which intends to display a complete picture of principal-agent problem 
between large and small shareholders. Fan and Wong (2002) found that once the large 
shareholders can control listed companies’ operation, the same control could be 
exerted on accounting information. PBC cause damages to the interests of other 
investors, and retard the healthy development of capital market. Facing great pressure 
from regulatory authorities, small shareholders and others, the large shareholders can 
extended their control to accounting information, and manage earnings to conceal and 
maintain PBC. In other words, they will excuse themselves from being blamed using 
accounting language. 
Based on the above analytical framework, this dissertation choese cash 
expropriation and private placement discount as typical tunneling ante and post 
reform on split share structure, and studies PBC and PBC based earnings management 
empirically. Split share structure distort large shareholders’ manner of obtain interests, 
and cash expropriation is an example. Conflicts between large and small shareholders 
alleviated after the reform, but new type of tunneling such as unfair private offering 
emerges. Based on principal-agent theory, I find that manipulation of offering 
discount is one of the ways of tunneling. Empirical study on the two typical kinds of 
tunneling shows that large shareholders select the manner of PBC contingently with 















opportunistic motivation, information asymmetry etc. justify PBC. Reform on split 
share structure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for constraint of PBC. The 
dissertation further finds that large shareholders drive listed companies to manage 
earnings in order to conceal and maintain PBC. After controlling for the effects of loss, 
SEO and scale etc. on earnings management, I find that the more cash expropriation 
the more earnings management upwardly; compared with other companies, 
companies that offer securities privately show higher degree of earnings management. 
Using private offering sample it further shows that companies offer securities to major 
shareholders demonstrate even more earnings management although the empirical 
results can’t tell the direction of earnings management. This corroborates the 
argument that earnings management is reflection of agency problems on accounting 
(Lei and Liu, 2006). Earnings management plays a part to facilitate PBC. 
Possible contributions of this dissertation are: First, combines PBC and earnings 
management into the same topic, and studys their relationship through contract 
analysis under principal-agency framework; Second, extends research of the manner 
of PBC using theoretical analysis and empirical test, and points out that the reform of 
split share struture (full circulation) is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
interests synergy of different type of shareholders. Third, extends the topic of PBC to 
earnings management phenomena and investigate how large shareholders get listed 
companies to manage earnings in order to conceal and maintain PBC. 
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